Part I
EVE OF THE WAR
Chapter One. IMPERIALISTS START THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Chapter Two. THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE THE WAR
Chapter One
IMPERIALISTS START THE SECOND WORLD WAR
- War Danger Grows. USSR Fights for Peace
- Outbreak of the Second World War
- German Preparations for War Against the USSR
1. War Danger Grows. USSR Fights for Peace
In the first half of the twentieth century the world experienced two destructive wars, the responsibility for which devolves on the imperialist system. The first war, 1914‑18, ended in victory for the Entente (Britain, France and the United States), but yielded no lasting peace. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 did not eradicate the contradictions that had caused the war; the scramble for markets, sources of raw material and spheres of investment, coupled with the struggle for power, remained the main elements guiding the foreign policy of the capitalist states. The uneven development of the capitalist countries, particularly pronounced in the period between the two world wars, broke the balance of forces that had taken shape in the capitalist world as a result of the First World War and been recorded in the treaties of Versailles and Washington.
The deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, sparked by the First World War and the Great October Socialist Revolution, still further aggravated all the imperialist contradictions. Imperialism was no longer an all‑embracing system. The socialist revolution in Russia had shaken the entire edifice of world capitalism. The world split into two opposite systems, and the Soviet Union began exercising considerable influence on international affairs.
The imperialist contradictions became particularly pronounced during the world‑wide crisis of 1929‑33, the most far‑reaching and most destructive economic convulsion in the history of capitalism. It began in the United States of America, then spread to other capitalist countries, the 1933 industrial output dropping to 64 per cent of the 1929 level in the United States, 88 per cent in Britain, 65 per cent in Germany and 81 per cent in France. World trade shrank by 65 per cent. There was mass unemployment. The number of jobless totalled 13,700,000 in the United States, nearly 5,000,000 in Germany and 2,600,000 in Britain, aggregating 30,000,000 in the capitalist world.
The fight for markets and spheres of influence, and for a redistribution of colonies, became more acute. In 1931 Japan embarked on armed conquest, invading Northeast China and seeking to oust British, French and United States interests from Asia, especially China, and thereby creating a flashpoint in the Far East.
Of the European countries Germany was afflicted most of all. Wholesale unemployment and the steep slide of the living standard saw the economic depression there grow into a political crisis. Most of the bourgeois parties found their position undermined. The attempts of the bourgeoisie to find a way out of the crisis by intensifying the already ruthless exploitation of the proletariat and other working people evoked popular unrest and resistance. The parliamentary forms of the bourgeois dictatorship were no longer able to keep the exploited people in check. Under these conditions various groups of German monopoly capital, who had long been planning to set up a government that would rule with a “firm hand” and prepare for another war with world domination as the objective, turned to the National‑Socialists. They regarded the nazi clique as their strongest weapon for crushing the peace‑loving, democratic forces of the German people and, through unbridled nationalistic and chauvinistic propaganda, diverting the people from the revolutionary struggle and leading them to the road of revenge. The German monopolies installed the nazis in power in January 1933, with the result that the leadership of the state passed into the hands of the most aggressive and reactionary circles.
The nazi ideology as expounded by Adolf Hitler, the nazi chief, in Mein Kampf, was rabidly chauvinist, preaching “superiority of the German race” and contending that the nation lacked “living space” (Lebensraum). The nazis exploited the anti‑Versailles sentiment and the discontent generated by the growing exploitation and the lack of political rights to aver that nothing but war could remedy the situation. They nursed plans of European conquest and world power, making the Soviet Union their main target. “Speaking today of more land in Europe,” Hitler declared, “we should think first and foremost of Russia and her subject border countries. Providence appears to point that way.” Acting on the desires of the German monopolies, the nazis began preparing a new war of aggrandizement, creating the second flashpoint for it—in the heart of Europe.
With antagonism growing more acute, two opposite alignments emerged. The first was a bloc of fascist powers—Germany, Italy and Japan. In October 1936, Germany and Italy formed the Berlin‑Rome Axis, and in the following month Germany and Japan signed an Anti‑Comintern Pact with the avowed purpose of co‑operating against the Communist International. In fact, however, the Pact, joined by Italy in 1937, was an aggressive alliance contesting world power. It was spearheaded at the Soviet Union, testimony of this being the secret protocol appended to the Anti‑Comintern Pact. This protocol stated in part that “the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is seeking to achieve the purposes of the Communist International and intends to use its Armed Forces to this end”. The allegation that the USSR was trying to achieve the aims of the Communist International by military means was so wild that Germany and Japan did not venture, for the time being, to state it openly in the Anti‑Comintern Pact, for it would have sounded like a direct challenge to the Soviet Union.
The other alignment, consisting of Britain, France and the United States, emerged more gradually, delayed by acute contradictions between the United States and Britain, each of which was trying to come to terms with Germany and thereby strengthen its hand against the other. As a result this alignment was finally shaped somewhat later, already after the war began.
That the two capitalist groupings came into being did not mitigate the struggle in each of them. But the main contradictions were those between the groupings. The imperialists of the leading powers, chiefly of Germany and Japan, were out to secure a fundamental redivision of the world. A military clash between the imperialist vultures was looming. In their bid for supremacy the fascist states were pushing the world into another global war.
In the late thirties fascist aggression spread rapidly. Italy overran Ethiopia in 1935, and in 1936 Germany and Italy organised an armed intervention in Spain. Japan was still on the rampage in the Far East, resuming her war against China in 1937. The flames spread and the shadow of fascism hung ominously over Europe, Asia and Africa.
The Soviet Union, its policy consistently one of peace, called for a system of collective security to bridle the aggressors. If war broke out in any part of the globe, the USSR showed, it would inevitably engulf the world; all peace‑loving countries consequently had an equal stake in collective action.
Democrats all over the world favoured the Soviet proposals. Some of the more far‑sighted Western politicians also called for joint action.
The Soviet proposals for a system of European security were embodied in the draft of an Eastern Pact suggested by the USSR in talks with France. This draft envisaged a multilateral treaty of mutual assistance to be signed by a large number of European states. The Pact did not materialise on account of the negative stand adopted by Germany and Poland and also, in effect, by Britain. Nonetheless, thanks to its perseverance, the Soviet Union signed treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. As an interrelated system, these treaties might have provided a sound foundation for uniting the efforts of peace‑loving states to curb fascist aggression.
Further developments showed that while the British Government and, from the close of 1935, the Government of France spoke of a desire for peace, they were actually nullifying the efforts to set up a system of European security. The ruling circles of these countries knew the extent of the fascist peril to their imperialist interests. Having seized important strategic points in the Far East, the Red Sea area and in Spain, the Tokyo‑Berlin‑Rome alignment directly threatened the Western powers, but for the British and French capitalists the Soviet socialist state and the revolutionary movement at home were still the bigger enemy. For that reason the British and French governments refused to act with the Soviet Union against the aggressors. They hoped to head off the fascist states and direct them against the Soviet Union to achieve their two fondest objectives: the destruction or weakening of the USSR by forces other than themselves and, at the same time, the weakening of Germany, Italy and Japan, their imperialist rivals. Accordingly, the Western powers encouraged the fascist countries, seeking to channel their aggressiveness eastward against the USSR, and in so doing were willing to sacrifice Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and other East and Southeast European states.
US policy, too, had a fatal influence on the cause of peace. It will be recalled that after the First World War, along with the British and French, the US monopolies extended enormous financial assistance in order to enable Germany to restore and expand her heavy industry. This was one of the key factors unleashing nazi aggression. In the mid‑thirties, however, with Germany outstripping Britain and France in economic growth and competing in world markets with the United States, US‑German economic relations deteriorated. Matters began to move towards an open clash between the USA and Germany. In this situation, instead of opposing the expansionist ambitions of the nazis, the USA, like Britain and France, pursued a policy of encouraging fascist aggression, helping the British and French ruling classes in their attempts to come to terms with the fascist states in the hope of resolving the contradictions of the capitalist world at the expense of the Soviet Union.
Naturally, the Western governments could not pursue their dangerous policy in the open. Their encouragement of aggression was camouflaged. Shortly before Italy’s attack on Ethiopia, for example, the US Government proclaimed its “neutrality”. Countering the proposal for collective security, British diplomats advocated appeasement, that is, concessions to the aggressor which, they claimed, would ensure peace. During the Italo‑German intervention in Spain, Britain and France proclaimed “non‑intervention”.
Obviously, “neutrality”, “appeasement” and “non‑intervention” stood for a rejection of collective security, reassuring the aggressors, as it were, that no aid would be forthcoming for their victims. This encouraged the fascist states to extend their seizures, and they made adroit use of the Anglo‑French anti‑Soviet sentiment to prepare for war in the West.
In the autumn of 1937 the nazis began drawing up operational plans for new conquests. The behaviour of the Western powers gave them reason to hope that they could avoid simultaneous operations on more than one front and crush France and Britain first. Victory over those two countries, they thought, would be won at a cheaper price, and, as an essential preliminary, they set out to strengthen Germany’s strategic and economic positions, aiming their thrust at a number of Central and East European countries, with Austria as the first victim.
On March 11, 1938, Berlin broadcast faked reports of a “bloody Communist uprising” in Austria, actually a fascist‑instigated coup, and on the pretext of restoring order nazi troops invaded the country on the same day. Two days later, Austria was incorporated in the German Reich.
The Western powers looked on impassively. The only power to come out for Austrian independence was the Soviet Union. Once again it called on the peace‑loving states to organise collective action and stay the hand of the aggressor. “Tomorrow,” a Soviet Government Statement said, “it may be too late, while today there is still a chance if all countries, especially the Great Powers, adopt a firm and unambiguous stand.” But the Soviet appeal fell on deaf ears. The Western governments kept egging Germany on against the East and Southeast, with Czechoslovakia next on Hitler’s list.
Taking advantage of the fact that a large percentage of the population in Western Czechoslovakia—the Sudeten Region—were Germans, the nazis built up a fifth column there of pro‑fascist elements. On Berlin’s orders, Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten nazis, demanded autonomy, while Berlin used the pretext of “protecting” Germans in the Sudeten to launch a strident campaign. To create a pretext for intervention, the Henlein gang provoked clashes with the Czechoslovak authorities. In mid‑May 1938 reports of German troop concentrations along the Czech border compelled the Czechoslovak Government to strengthen the country’s defences. Tension increased. An armed collision was possible at any moment, bringing with it the threat of a war in Europe.
The world followed the events anxiously. Public opinion demanded action to halt fascist aggression. The Soviet Union, France and Czechoslovakia had mutual aid agreements and could have forced the nazis to abandon their plans.
The Soviet Union repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to honour its commitments under the Soviet‑Czechoslovak and Soviet‑French mutual aid treaties. In face of French wavering, the Soviet Union considered that it was its duty to support Czechoslovakia even if France procrastinated with the fulfilment of her pact pledges.* On April 26, 1938, M. I. Kalinin publicly stated: “…There is nothing in the pact to prevent one of the sides giving its assistance without waiting for France to act.” J. V. Stalin asked Klement Gottwald, leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to tell Eduard Beneš, then President of Czechoslovakia, that if for purposes of self‑defence Czechoslovakia started hostilities against nazi Germany, the USSR was prepared to render her military assistance even if France did not go to her aid.
* On the insistence of the Czechoslovak Government, the Soviet‑Czechoslovak Treaty of May 16, 1935, contained the reservation that the Soviet Union would be obligated to go to Czechoslovakia’s assistance only if France extended similar assistance.
The USSR backed up these foreign policy acts with the necessary military steps, one of which was the massing in districts abutting the western frontiers of 30 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions, one tank corps, three tank brigades and 12 air brigades. Another 30 infantry and six cavalry divisions, two tank corps and 15 tank brigades were alerted. Other mobilisation measures were carried out simultaneously: 328,000 men were called up from the reserve, and tens of thousands of privates and non‑commissioned officers whose term of conscription had expired were retained in the Armed Forces.
All the steps taken by the Soviet Union, as is stated in the Theses of the CC CPSU on the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, “came up against the resistance of the ‘Munichmen’, who sought to direct nazi aggression against the USSR and enter into an alliance with Hitler”. Meanwhile, in line with their policy of encouraging aggression, the Western powers had decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia in the hope of obtaining from Hitler a pledge that Germany would not attack them. British and French diplomats began energetically to prepare the ground for this sordid bargain, with the British Government assuming the initiative inasmuch as France had a treaty with Czechoslovakia.
In the autumn of 1938, the Western powers struck a bargain with Hitler. This happened at a conference in Munich on September 29 and 30. It was attended by Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Czechoslovakia, whose fate was at stake, was not admitted to the talks, her delegates waiting for the outcome outside the conference room. The Soviet Union was likewise not invited, because it would have blocked this “appeasement” on the part of Britain and France.
At Munich, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, the British and French Prime Ministers, consented to Germany’s annexing the Sudetenland. Thus, Czechoslovakia lost her fortifications along the border with Germany and she was placed at Hitler’s mercy.
When the Czechoslovak delegation, informed of this deal, raised objections, the British spokesman replied:
“If you do not accept, you will have to settle your affairs with the Germans by yourself. Perhaps the French will put it more amiably, but I assure you that they share our views. They will disinterest themselves.”
The following assessment of the Munich deal appeared in the August 1968 issue of the journal Kommunist, organ of the CC CPSU: “The heads of government of Britain, France, Italy and Germany signed Czechoslovakia’s death sentence in Munich on September 29, 1938. The Munich agreement, on whose legality the Bonn Government insists to this day, has entered history as a betrayal of a nation and an illicit bargain with a robber.”
Even in the situation obtaining at the time Czechoslovakia might have been saved had her Government accepted the hand of friendship that was stretched out to her by the Soviet Union. In reply to an inquiry from Beneš, the Soviet Government stated on September 20 that it was prepared, in accordance with the operating treaty, to render Czechoslovakia immediate and effective assistance. In the event France proved to be disloyal to Czechoslovakia, which would annul the Soviet Union’s treaty commitments, the USSR could go to Czechoslovakia’s assistance as a member of the League of Nations in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant. For this the Czechoslovak Government had to request the League to invoke the above‑mentioned Articles. Two days later, on September 22, V. P. Potyomkin, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied in the affirmative to a question from the Czechoslovak Minister as to whether “in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia the Government of the USSR would go to the latter’s assistance without waiting for a decision by the League of Nations”. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia insistently demanded that the Government respond to the nation’s firm determination to resist invasion and, accepting Soviet aid, reject the imperialist diktat. But the Prague rulers chose to capitulate.
Abandoning areas of Czechoslovakia to Germany in payment for the latter’s undertaking to attack the Soviet Union, London and Paris thought they had ensured themselves against nazi aggression. At Munich, Chamberlain suggested a joint statement, and the Anglo‑German declaration that followed, dated September 30, 1938, was, in effect, a non‑aggression treaty. Its signatories proclaimed their wish “never to go to war with one another again” and to settle all issues by consultation. A similar Franco‑German declaration was made public somewhat later (December 6, 1938).
The United States was obviously involved in preparing the Munich deal. While disavowing complicity in the sell‑out of Czechoslovakia, US diplomats covertly aided the Anglo‑French scheme. In a conversation with Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador to Britain, his US counterpart, Joseph Kennedy, declared on June 13, 1938, that in economic matters Germany had to have a free hand in the East as well as in the Southeast, the implications of this being patently clear. The USA bears the full responsibility for the Munich decisions along with Britain and France.
The parties to the Munich deal described it as the beginning of a new European order. They maintained that Munich would assure peace in the lifetime of the “present generation”. In fact, however, Munich had tragic repercussions, bringing the world to the threshold of another war.
The Soviet Union, backed by advanced sections of the working class in the capitalist countries, opposed the plans for igniting a new imperialist conflagration. The Communist Parties of Europe headed by staunch leaders of the world working‑class movement, Marcel Cachin, Maurice Thorez, Palmiro Togliatti (Ercoli), Georgi Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov, Ernst Thaelmann, Wilhelm Pieck, José Diaz, Dolores Ibarruri, Klement Gottwald, William Gallacher, Harry Pollitt and many others, sought to unite the forces of peace, explaining the implications of “appeasement” and “non‑intervention” and stressing that the only way fascism could be blocked was for the world proletariat to act against it in concert. The inexorable course of events bore them out. The danger that beset Europe was gradually being understood. The idea of collective action against fascism and war won currency among the workers. Long before the Czechoslovak events, the facts proved that whenever the working class acted in unison, it won the day. This was so in, say, February 1934 in France, when the people of Paris led by the Communist Party firmly opposed fascism, blocking a reactionary fascist coup. It was, therefore, essential to unite the masses for the fight against fascism, and this the Communist Parties proceeded to do.
The Seventh Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in the summer of 1935, was an important milestone in the struggle for unity. It told the world of the true nature of fascism, describing it as a “barefaced terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital”; it called attention to the fact that resort to fascist methods by the bourgeoisie was associated directly with war preparations, and appealed to the peoples of all countries to range themselves alongside the working class in a broad anti‑fascist front supporting the Soviet Union. The decisions of that Congress opened people’s eyes and intensified the fight against war.
But war could not be prevented, for the Soviet Union was then the only country pursuing an active peace policy, while in the capitalist countries the working‑class movement was split on account of the treacherous policies of the Right‑wing Social‑Democratic leaders.
The sinister clouds gathered rapidly. On March 15, 1939, German troops entered Prague, putting an end to Czechoslovakia’s independence. A week later the nazis seized the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda on the Baltic coast. An unequal agreement was imposed on Rumania, pressing her economy into the service of the nazi war machine. The German demands on Poland contained threatening undertones. The nazis wanted possession of Danzig (Gdansk) and German communication lines across the so‑called Polish corridor that gave Poland an outlet to the sea. German‑Polish relations grew more and more tense by the hour. On April 11, Hitler endorsed Operation Weiss, an operational plan for the conquest of Poland.
Envying the “successes” of her partner in aggression and the impunity with which Hitler was accomplishing his objectives, Italy invaded Albania on April 7, 1939. On May 22 Germany and Italy concluded the so‑called Steel Pact, a predatory military alliance containing not even a hint of “defensive” or “anti‑communist” pretexts.
War was only a few months away. The time was one of uneasy anticipation. The Soviet Union repeatedly called for joint efforts by the USSR, Britain and France, and all peace‑loving nations. The 18th Congress of the CPSU(B) was held in Moscow in March 1939. It called attention to the designs of the war architects and urged caution in order to prevent them from dragging the USSR into the conflict. It also stated the opinion that German fascism was the most likely adversary of the Soviet Union in any coming war.
Hitler’s seizure of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 laid bare the viciousness of the policy pursued by the Western powers. After Munich, Chamberlain and Daladier had been acclaimed as peacemakers by the bourgeoisie and the Social‑Democrats in Britain and France. Now, almost everybody realised that “appeasement” was a mortal danger to the Western powers. Voicing discontent, the public demanded firm action in unison with the Soviet Union.* The rulers of Britain and France, too, were troubled by Hitler’s ambitions. They feared he might head against the West instead of driving on eastward.
* The Soviet Government was deprived of the possibility of going to Czechoslovakia’s assistance at the time: one of the terms of the Munich deal was Czechoslovakia’s renunciation of her treaties of mutual assistance with France and the Soviet Union and the replacement of these treaties by an “international guarantee”. On October 9, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs inquired if Prague wished the future boundaries and the country’s independence to be guaranteed also by the Soviet Union. The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry replied that this question could only be decided by the partners in the Munich Conference, thereby again rejecting the Soviet offer of assistance.
The British and French decided on a new diplomatic manoeuvre. They were eager to allay public opinion, on the one hand, and disturb Hitler’s peace of mind with the prospect of a military alliance with the Soviet Union, on the other. They hoped Germany would then come to terms with them. To create the appearance of a united front against Germany, the British and French governments gave guarantees to Poland, Rumania, Greece and a few other countries and began diplomatic talks with the Soviet Government in the spring and summer of 1939.
The USSR wanted an agreement ensuring effective Soviet, British and French co‑operation against aggression. The objective foundation for this was available, for the peoples of all three countries wanted peace.
The Soviet proposals were based on equal rights and equal commitments. Britain and France, on the other hand, endeavoured to impose unilateral commitments on the USSR, demanding that the Soviet Union aid them if Germany marched westward, while evading reciprocal undertakings. What they wanted was to goad the Soviet Union into a war against Germany with themselves looking on. It was really a policy of provocation. After drawn‑out negotiations the Western powers finally agreed to sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, but to make the pact an effective instrument against aggression it was necessary to define the form, volume and time of mutual military assistance. The Soviet Government, therefore, suggested initiating talks between the military missions of the three countries. The talks opened in Moscow in mid‑August 1939 and the Soviet military mission submitted a concrete plan of joint operations by the Armed Forces of the USSR, Britain and France, making provision against all the possible patterns of aggression in Europe. Having no common frontier with Germany, the Soviet Union could not help its prospective allies unless its troops were allowed passage across Poland. The Western spokesmen evaded an earnest discussion. They had no provisional plan of joint operations, and subsequent publication of relevant documents indicated that neither Britain nor France were seriously envisaging military co‑operation with the USSR. A secret directive to the British mission, for example, said that “the British Government is unwilling to enter into any detailed commitments” which were likely to “tie our hands”. The mission was ordered to “go very slowly”, and this at a time when the German‑Polish crisis was certain to come to a head at any moment.
The reason for the British tactics of procrastination was that London was conducting clandestine talks with Germany, to which it attached far greater importance. British diplomats offered the nazis a non‑aggression pact and suggested coming to terms on world spheres of influence. H. Wohltat, the German negotiator, was told by R. Hudson, his British counterpart, that “three big regions offered the two nations an immense field for economic activity: the English Empire, China and Russia. Here agreement was possible, as also in other regions; England had no economic ambitions in the Balkans”. Thus, in reply to the nazi demands for the return of the former German colonies that had fallen into British hands after the First World War, British diplomacy openly sought to direct German aggression eastward, against the USSR. The proposals and blandishments were many. Dirksen, German Ambassador in London, pointed out in his reports to Berlin that if his country accepted Britain’s proposals, “England would renounce the guarantees she had given to certain states in the German sphere of interest. Further, Great Britain would bring influence to bear on France to get her to give up her alliance with the Soviet Union and her commitments in Southeast Europe. She would also drop her treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union”. This shows beyond all doubt that the British Government used the Moscow talks to pressure Germany into signing an agreement aimed against the Soviet Union.
In the summer of 1939 the Soviet Union faced the prospect of a possible war on two fronts in total political isolation from the rest of the world. The threat of a German aggression from the West was complemented by that of a Japanese attack from the East. In May Japanese troops crossed the border into the Mongolian People’s Republic at Khalkhin‑Gol. Under its mutual aid treaty, the USSR joined Mongolia in repelling the invaders. In the circumstances, the Soviet Government had no choice but to thwart the efforts of international reaction to destroy the world’s first socialist state. This was a question of life and death for the Soviet people and was also in the interest of working people the world over. That was why the USSR consented to a non‑aggression pact offered by Germany and signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939.
The talks between the military missions in Moscow ceased as a result of the stand adopted by the British and French representatives. In an interview published in Pravda on August 27, 1939, K. Y. Voroshilov, who led the Soviet delegation at these talks, stated: “The talks with Britain and France were suspended not because the USSR had signed a non‑aggression pact with Germany. On the contrary, the USSR signed that pact because, in fact, the military talks with France and Britain had entered a deadlock.” Afraid as yet to go to war against the Soviet Union, the nazi Government suggested the treaty to gain a free hand in Western Europe and then, on seizing Europe’s vast resources, to attack the USSR.
When it signed the treaty, the Soviet Government was aware that Germany would sooner or later march eastward. But the treaty precluded a united anti‑Soviet front of imperialist powers and, moreover, gave the Soviet Union time to strengthen her defences and thereby prevent the imperialists from resolving their contradictions at her expense.*
* Post‑war publications show that the ruling circles of the imperialist states had never relinquished these attempts. Moreover they redoubled their efforts in this direction even after the Second World War had broken out. The following two facts are noteworthy. In April 1941, in forwarding a message from Churchill to Stalin through the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps found it necessary to state: “…unless the Soviet Government decided on immediate co‑operation with the countries still opposing the Axis in the Balkans, the Russians would miss the last chance of defending their frontier with others.” Meanwhile, the British Intelligence Centre in New York, then headed by the Canadian millionaire William Stephenson who was closely linked with Churchill, leaked the information to the German Embassy in the USA that “the USSR intends to launch further military aggression the instant Germany is embroiled in major operations”. The British Government went to all ends to ignite a clash between the USSR and Germany as soon as possible.
To this day our enemies and ill‑wishers seek to blame the Soviet Union for the suspension of the military talks with Britain and France and accuse it of having deliberately sought to provoke war between Germany and the Western powers. These attacks on Soviet foreign policy are so unfounded and absurd that even some bourgeois historians are compelled to reject them. For example, in a book entitled Disputed Problems of Latest History Jacques F. de Launey writes: “…the Russians hoped to come to terms with the French and British…. There is no evidence to support the accusation that the Russians had played a double game.” Any researcher who is at all unbiassed will, upon studying the international situation of those days and the documents pertaining to the military talks, inevitably draw the conclusion that a double game was played precisely by the British and French governments, who were out to engineer a military clash between the USSR and Germany and use it in their own imperialist interests.
2.Outbreak of The Second World War
On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. Britain and France replied to this by declaring war on Germany on September 3. Officially this was done to “save” Poland, but in fact the British and French ruling circles were coldly indifferent to the destiny of the Polish people. It was only their fear that Germany would become an excessively strong imperialist rival that made them go to the war against her. In spite of the Munichmen’s calculation to unleash war between the capitalist camp and the isolated socialist state, war broke out within the capitalist world.
The Wehrmacht High Command planned to crush Poland in a lightning campaign by a sudden massive assault involving large forces, particularly armour and aircraft. Five armies overran Poland from three directions—from East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia. These consisted of 65 divisions and brigades, including 41 infantry and 11 panzer and motorised divisions. The invading force had 2,800 tanks, nearly 2,000 aircraft and over 100 warships. Poland’s strength was: 36 infantry divisions, two motorised brigades and 11 cavalry brigades. The troops were supported by 860 light tanks, 420 aircraft and 12 warships.
Hitler was certain that neither Britain nor France would go to Poland’s aid. He was right. Although the two countries declared war on Germany, they sent no help to Poland.
The mobilisation announced in Poland on August 31 was, in effect, stillborn. The rapid advance of the German troops, marching from west, north and south, was facilitated by the absence of strong fortifications. Expecting to fight the Soviet Union some day, Poland’s rulers had built their fortifications along the eastern frontier. Within a week the nazis drove deep into the country. Rolling back after the initial assault, the Polish armies were soon in full retreat. Confusion reigned at the headquarters of the Polish High Command. On September 4‑6 the rulers abandoned Warsaw, fleeing to Lublin and Brest. On September 17 they crossed the Rumanian frontier, leaving the people and the country to their fate. But patriots stood firm. The fighting units showed unexampled tenacity. Volunteers, many of them Communists, fought bravely at their side. The defenders of Warsaw displayed indomitable courage. Defying air‑raids and the ferocious onslaught, Warsaw held the nazis at bay for three long weeks. But the strength of the adversaries was unequal. The German armies gradually locked the Poles into a huge pocket.
The September catastrophe spelled total defeat for bourgeois‑landowner Poland and the loss of her state independence. One of the main causes was the adventurist, anti‑Soviet policy of the ruling clique, which counted on utilising the contradictions between Germany and the USSR. By turning down Soviet assistance, the Polish Government opened the door to the aggressors and doomed its people to suffering and national humiliation.
Betrayal by the Anglo‑French rulers was another cause. The Western powers had given “guarantees” merely to use Poland as a pawn in their diplomatic game with the nazi Reich. In the hour of peril, Britain and France abandoned their ally. A strong thrust from the West might have changed the entire course of the war. Alfred Jodl, Hitler’s Chief of Operations, told the Nuremberg Tribunal that Germany escaped defeat in 1939 because the approximately 110 French and British divisions facing 23 German divisions in the West while Poland was being strangled were totally inactive.
Bourgeois historians attribute this inactivity to the unpreparedness of the Western powers. But actually London and Paris hoped the nazi armies sweeping eastward would not stop on reaching the Soviet border. They were reluctant to aid Poland for this reason and gave Hitler to understand that he could attack the USSR with no peril to himself. In effect, this was a continuation of the Munich policy.
Nor did Britain and France change their policy after Poland’s defeat. A strange calm prevailed on the Western front: huge armies faced each other, but no battles were fought, no bombs were dropped on German soil; instead, Allied planes dropped anti‑Soviet leaflets on nazi troop positions, reproaching Hitler for “reconciling himself with Moscow” and refusing to combat communism. The soldiers were bored. People referred to the war as “sitting”, “funny” and “phoney”. Many thought no shooting war would develop, with matters ending in an “honourable peace”.
The Anglo‑French rulers held that Hitler would not risk an offensive in the West. “I don’t think the Germans have any intention of attacking us,” Neville Chamberlain said to General Bernard Montgomery in December 1939. Similar illusions were entertained by members of the French Government, as de Gaulle attested in his war memoirs. French and British monopolists continued to supply Germany with strategic materials via neutral countries.
The French bourgeoisie rendered Hitler an inestimable service by attacking the democratic forces in France. The main blow was aimed at the Communists, who were the staunchest anti‑fascists. The Communist Party was outlawed on September 26, 1939. Thousands of Communists were thrown into prisons and concentration camps. Democratic organisations and their press were smashed.
Reluctant to come to grips with Germany, the Western Allies sought to come to terms with her. They let the nazis know through their embassies in Luxembourg, Spain and Italy that war against Germany was “unpopular” in the West and that a peace settlement could be reached on certain terms.
To urge the nazis eastward against the USSR, the Anglo‑French rulers exploited the Soviet‑Finnish war. A virulent anti‑Soviet campaign was started in France, Britain, the USA and other bourgeois countries. “An indescribable rage gripped the bourgeoisie,” wrote French journalist Henri de Kerillis, “obsessed by the idea of a crusade…. All we heard was: ‘War on Russia!’… The anti‑communist delirium reached its peak and assumed epileptic forms.”
On the pretext of helping Finland, Britain and France were busy hammering out an anti‑Soviet front, calling on Germany to join. They collaborated with the fascist powers, shipping arms and ammunition to Finland, hastily mustered an expeditionary force for an attack on Murmansk and Leningrad and planned the invasion of the Soviet Union from the south. Thus, instead of fighting Germany, Britain and France concentrated on fomenting war against the USSR.
The anti‑Soviet preoccupation of the British and French governments and the total inactivity of the Anglo‑French forces on the Western front enabled the nazis to prepare thoroughly for continued aggression in Europe. The Wehrmacht Command felt that the time had come to crush France and turn Northwestern Europe into a springboard against Britain. The next stage was to be the invasion of the Soviet Union. The balance of strength had changed. In the autumn of 1939 the German Armed Forces could not risk a contest with the West; they still lacked the potential. But by the spring of 1940 the situation changed. Arms production had climbed 54 per cent, and the Armed Forces consisted of 156 divisions as against the 105 divisions in November 1939. One hundred and thirty‑five divisions, 42 of them in the Wehrmacht High Command reserve, were marked out for action in the West; the Air Force had grown to over 3,500 planes, and the armoured divisions had nearly 2,600 tanks.
The Western powers had 143 divisions in France, Belgium and Holland (99 French, 10 British, 22 Belgian, 10 Dutch and two Polish) equipped with more than 3,000 tanks and more than 2,700 planes. One hundred and two divisions were designated for operations against Germany, and 16 were in the reserve of the French Command.
The Allied Command drew up its so‑called Plan D, applicable if the Germans struck via Holland and Belgium. Under this plan the Anglo‑French troops would respond to a German invasion by entering Belgium and taking up positions along the Antwerp‑Sedan line together with the Belgian forces.
Having information that the Allies were concentrating in the north, the nazi Command envisaged the main blow somewhat to the south, in the Ardennes, where a strong armoured group would break through the Sedan sector in the general direction of Abbeville to the Atlantic seaboard, emerging in the rear of the Allied armies in the north.
The German Armed Forces were deployed in strict accordance with their plan. But before invading France, nazi Germany overran Denmark and Norway early in April 1940. On May 10 German troops crossed into Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The German offensive in the West gained momentum. The Allied Command set Plan D into motion, dispatching its armies to Belgium.
In the meantime, German armour crossed Luxembourg and drove over the Ardennes. The panzer columns stretched out along the narrow mountain roads were an excellent target for Allied bombers. But no Allied planes appeared, and the nazis reached the Maas unmolested.
The French Command, which thought the sector unimportant, had manned it with two of its weakest armies. The advancing German force had a 7:1 superiority in tanks and a 20:1 superiority in aircraft, with a 25:1 and 50:1 superiority respectively in the breakthrough area. This assured the nazis of success. On May 14 the German troops crossed the Maas at Dinan, Monthermé and Sedan and drove deep into the French positions.
After this easy victory the Germans expected the Allies to commit their strategic reserve, mount a counter‑attack and try to close the breach. Nothing of the kind was done. So on May 18 the Germans renewed their drive to the mouth of the Somme. On the following day they captured Amiens, their forward units reaching the shore southwest of Dunkirk on May 21. Forty British, French and Belgian divisions were cut off from the main Allied forces. Believing that the fate of the enemy group was sealed, the German Command stopped the panzer columns and on May 24 ordered infantry and air to advance alone. The objective was to annihilate the enveloped troops and prevent a British withdrawal across the Channel by occupying the shore. The order of May 24 indicates that the tanks were halted because they were wanted for the main drive—a thrust south into France in order to force her to surrender. Besides, Hitler had made his final decision to prepare intensively for war against the Soviet Union, for which he would need a large number of tanks. But the German Command underestimated enemy strength and overrated the nazi infantry and, especially, the Luftwaffe. The British Command managed to evacuate the bulk of its forces to the British Isles. True, all heavy weapons and equipment fell to the enemy.
The Allied setback was not a total disaster. France still had fresh reserves and stocks of arms. The patriotic forces rose to the occasion. On June 6 the French Communist Party pleaded with the Government to distribute arms to the people and make the war a people’s cause for freedom and independence. However, dreading its own people more than the nazis, the capitalist Government refused. On June 22, Pétain signed a surrender at Compiegne. Two days later, France concluded an armistice with Italy, which had declared war on June 10, when the outcome of the hostilities was a foregone conclusion.
Having captured France, the nazis divested her of her freedom. A larger section of the country was occupied by nazi troops. The Pétain Government chose to collaborate with the invaders, placing the nation’s economy at the disposal of the Third Reich. A fascist regime was established in the unoccupied zone. Hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen were shipped off forcibly for hard labour in Germany.
But despite the defeat and the fascist reign of terror, the French power of resistance was not broken. The Communist Party called on the people to overthrow the Pétain regime and fight the invader. “Never will a great nation like ours become a nation of slaves,” the Party Manifesto, issued on July 10, 1940, read. “France with her glorious past will not kneel.” The Manifesto called for a broad front to fight for freedom, independence and regeneration. Combat groups were organised under Communist leadership, marking the start of the French Resistance movement.
In the first months of the war nazi Germany overran nearly the whole of Western Europe. Stimulated by the succession of easy victories, the nazis raved about a “new order”. This was to end the independence of the conquered countries, supplanted by ruthless social and national oppression. Occupation troops comported themselves with particular brutality in the Slav countries, where millions of people were exterminated. This was meant to cow nations into total submission. But it produced the reverse effect. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, the people would not bend. Patriots resisted the invaders.
The Resistance movement which rose to a new stage in the occupied countries after Germany’s attack on the USSR was part of the mammoth battle between the democratic forces and the forces of reaction and fascism. Historically, the Resistance was natural. It was a protest against the fascist “new order” and, with part of the capitalists and landowners collaborating with the nazis, was also aimed against the home‑grown reactionaries.
The fight for national liberation was inspired and organised by Communist and Workers’ Parties. They stirred the masses to a holy war against fascism, for national independence and freedom. The movement was democratic and embraced the workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals and much of the bourgeoisie, that is, the absolute majority. Communist Parties worked hand‑in‑hand with non‑proletarian organisations. United anti‑fascist fronts were forged in most of the occupied states. Communists interlaced the fight against fascism with the fight for social emancipation.
The Second World War was initially an imperialist war. The guilt for it lies with the imperialists of all countries, with the capitalist system, the direct responsibility for starting it falling squarely on nazi Germany.
The war was a complex convulsion. Unlike the First World War, it erupted in the midst of the general crisis of capitalism. A powerful socialist state, the Soviet Union, already existed. The first war had been an expression of the contradictions between rival imperialist powers, while the second expressed two sets of contradictions—those between the two capitalist coalitions, and those between the capitalist world as a whole and the Soviet socialist state.
Lenin’s teaching helps us define the nature of the Second World War. War is a continuation of politics by violent means. “All wars,” he stressed, “are inseparable from the political systems that engender them. The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before the war is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed.”
The fascist bloc—Germany, Italy and Japan—had predatory imperialist war aims: to enslave other states and peoples, eradicate socialism and democracy, suppress the revolutionary and national liberation movements, crush imperialist rivals and gain world supremacy. As far as the fascist states were concerned, it was an imperialist war.
Britain and France, which entered the war against Germany in 1939, also pursued imperialist aims: to preserve and strengthen their status as colonial powers and weaken their rivals—Germany, Italy and Japan. It was not their aim to destroy fascism. On the contrary, it was in their plans that the fascist states would come to grips with the Soviet Union, help crush the revolutionary and democratic movements in Europe and block the national liberation movement in the East. The war between Germany, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, was therefore imperialist during the first stage, though attributes of a just war of liberation were also in evidence. The Polish people, for example, deserted by their reactionary Government from the very outset of the war, rose to the struggle for national independence. Heroic resistance was put up against the nazi invaders by the Greek and Yugoslav peoples as well. In other occupied countries, too, the peoples fought an anti‑fascist war of liberation. True, at first this tendency did not substantially influence either the nature of the war or its fortunes. But the liberative trend became more pronounced in the latter half of 1940, gradually turning the war against nazi Germany into a just war for freedom.
After the initial setbacks of the Western powers, Britain faced the frightening prospect of invasion. Her people were determined to repel fascism, compelling the rulers to alter their bankrupt policy and fight the aggressor in earnest. The Soviet Union’s entry into the war after Hitler’s sneak attack was, however, what changed the nature of the war entirely. The USSR’s just war aims and tenacious resistance multiplied the strength of the Resistance movement in the occupied countries, and public pressure on the governments of the bourgeois‑democratic states redoubled. Though still in many ways hostile to the USSR, the rulers of Britain and the United States had no choice but to range themselves beside it in a united front, at least in the main issue: the prosecution of the war against nazi Germany, Italy and their allies. Thus, for the forces opposing Germany, the Second World War became a just, anti‑fascist war.
3.German Preparations for War against the USSR
After conquering France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, the nazis turned their eyes eastward. They knew that for them the Soviet Union was the main barrier to world supremacy. On March 30, 1941, Hitler referred to the coming war against the Soviet Union in the following terms: a war of annihilation, a war strikingly different from that in the West; in the East cruelty would be a boon for the future.
At the end of July 1940, top German military leaders had a conference in Berghof and set the date for the attack on the USSR: Spring 1941. On December 18, 1940, Hitler endorsed the plan for war against the Soviet Union, code‑named Operation Barbarossa. The nazi corps of generals approved it. After nazi Germany was defeated, it was claimed that Rundstedt, Halder and Brauchitsch had counselled Hitler against a war in the East. That is untrue. Fearing a war on two fronts, they were only somewhat dubious about attacking the Soviet Union before Britain had been put out of action.
The main politico‑military aim of Operation Barbarossa was to crush the USSR. Strategically, it was based on the Blitzkrieg doctrine. A powerful strike was envisaged to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in the country’s western areas, followed by a rapid advance deep into Soviet territory and the seizure of key political and economic centres. The capture of Moscow figured as a prime objective. Moscow’s fall, the planners thought, would mean final political, military and economic defeat for the USSR. The ultimate objective of the operation, the plan emphasised, was to “erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Arkhangelsk‑Volga”. Three strike groups were to pursue the offensive in three strategic directions: from East Prussia against Pskov and Leningrad, from east of Warsaw against Minsk and Smolensk, and from the Lublin area against Zhitomir and Kiev. Auxiliary attacks were envisaged from Finland and Rumania, then Germany’s allies.
Ground operations were assured air and naval support. The Luftwaffe was cast in an important role: its aim was to paralyse and crush Soviet air resistance and support the main ground operations. After suppressing the Soviet Air Force, with German troops advancing deep into the land, the Luftwaffe was to hit industrial and administrative centres in the Soviet East, chiefly the Urals. The Navy was to prevent the escape of Soviet naval vessels from the Baltic, for the nazis thought that after the fall of Leningrad the Soviet Baltic Fleet would be cornered.
The design behind Operation Barbarossa was a serious menace to the Soviet Union because its practical implementation would have meant the ultimate destruction of the socialist state. But this design was unrealistic. Hitler predicted that the Soviet Army would suffer a greater defeat than the French Army in 1940. He underrated the solidity of the Soviet social and political system, and the strength of the Red Army.
The nazis drew up a programme of extermination in occupied Soviet territory. It was a product of the fascist ideology and part of the general plan of war against the USSR approved by the German Government. The crimes planned against the Soviet people acquired the force of law, formalised in pertinent directives, disproving the reactionary historians in the FRG who claim that the brutalities were a retaliation for Soviet resistance behind the German lines.
On March 13, 1941, months before the attack on the USSR, the Wehrmacht High Command issued a “directive on special regions”, laying down strident occupational regulations in occupied territories. Commanders were vested with extraordinary powers. They had unlimited authority with regard to the civilian population. Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS and police, ordered to design the political administration in occupied areas, was told to proceed from the idea of “the determined struggle of two opposed political systems”. On May 13, 1941, the German Government endorsed a new directive on military jurisdiction in what it called “region Barbarossa”, spurning the very idea of mercy and demanding death for all partisans and partisan sympathisers. All who showed the least resistance to Germans, it said, should be shot without trial. Punitive operations against the civilian population, coupled with mass repressions, were also envisaged. In advance, men and officers were absolved of responsibility for any crimes they might commit on Soviet soil.
The extermination of Red Army prisoners of war was planned as well. The directive dated May 12, 1941, requiring instant killing of all captured political workers, is one of the most disgraceful documents issued by the German High Command.
Operation East, framed by the SS and police administration, called for the suppression by fire and sword of the Slav peoples, primarily the peoples of the Soviet Union. Eighty to eighty‑five per cent of all Poles, 65 per cent of the West Ukrainians and 75 per cent of the Byelorussians were to be driven off their land. The Russian population was to be enfeebled. Special commandos equipped with appropriate “technology” were formed for the mass execution of civilians. Blithely, Hitler told his subordinates: “We are obliged to depopulate as part of our mission of preserving the German population. We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation…. I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin!”
It was part of the nazi scheme to divest the Soviet Union of all its riches. A few days before the perfidious attack, Hermann Goring, vested with unlimited power to plunder occupied areas, endorsed special “directives” to that effect. Occupied areas must be instantly and fully used in the interest of Germany, he said, to obtain food and oil in maximum quantities. That was the main economic objective of the campaign.
Preparing for the new act of aggression, nazi Germany extended contacts with her allies, eager to involve more countries in the aggressive bloc and use their territories, manpower and other resources against the USSR. A triple alliance was concluded in Berlin between Germany, Japan and Italy on September 27, 1940, representing an undisguised anti‑Soviet military pact.
Bridgeheads were prepared in countries bordering on the Soviet Union in the southwest and northwest. The nazis went out of their way to consolidate relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. The ruling element in those countries sided wholeheartedly with the predatory nazi plan. Confirmed enemies of the Soviet Union, they were happy to join “the crusade” in the hope of acquiring new territory.
On November 20, 1940, Hungary acceded to the Tripartite Pact, having been promised annexations in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (the old Duchy of Galich and the Carpathian foothills up to the Dniester) for taking part in the war against the USSR, and Rumania followed suit on November 23. Rumanian dictator Ion Antonescu put his country at Hitler’s disposal. German troops were brought to man all important strategic points. The Rumanian Government promised to furnish the desired number of troops, and to increase shipments of oil and farm products for the Wehrmacht. In the early half of 1941 Hitler and Antonescu concluded an agreement for a joint attack against the Soviet Union. The Rumanian fascist clique was out to conquer Soviet Moldavia and gain possession of the southern part of the Ukraine.
In the autumn of 1940, the Tripartite Pact was joined by Finland and the puppet regime of Slovakia. Finland was promised Soviet Karelia (minus the Kola Peninsula) and Leningrad Region.
The royal Government of Bulgaria announced its accession to the Pact on March 1, 1941. German troops entered the country on the same day. The people, who had deep feelings of friendship for Russia, received the news with anger.
Nazi diplomacy endeavoured to lure Yugoslavia into the aggressive alliance. On March 25, 1941, the Tsvetkovitch Government signed a protocol on Yugoslavia’s accession to the Tripartite Pact, but thereby created a political crisis. The people revolted against the treacherous policy of their rulers. A coup on the night of March 26‑27, 1941, put General Simovitch in power, and a delegation was sent to Moscow, where it signed a treaty of friendship and non‑aggression on April 5, 1941. The Soviet Union’s intention was to prevent fascist aggression from spreading to the Balkan Peninsula. For this it was essential to preserve the independence of Yugoslavia and Greece, and deny to the fascists the use of the Balkans as a springboard for war against the USSR.
On failing to press Yugoslavia into their aggressive bloc, the nazi leaders decided to resort to violence. They could ill afford an unconquered Yugoslavia and Greece in the rear of their troops. Early in the morning of April 6, 1941, nazi armies attacked Yugoslavia with Italian and Hungarian support. The main cities, including Belgrade, were raided by the Luftwaffe. The Yugoslav troops resisted heroically. But the enemy surpassed them in strength, making a tragic outcome unavoidable. A surrender was signed at Sarajevo on April 18, 1941, delivering the country into the hands of the German invaders. But the peoples of Yugoslavia would not submit. Under communist guidance they waged an uncompromising struggle against the invaders.
In the meantime, German and Italian troops began the invasion of Greece. As in the autumn of 1940,* the Greeks resisted bravely. For a number of days the nazi troops were stalled on the Greek‑Bulgarian frontier, with the Italians bogged down at Florina. A British expeditionary corps of 50,000 men landed to assist Greece. But the scales tilted against the gallant Greek people. Treason by their generals, particularly George Tsolakoglu who surrendered the Epirus army, enabled the enemy to overrun the country and also occupy the numerous Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. At the end of May German troops took possession of Crete.
The capture of the Balkan Peninsula greatly strengthened the aggressive bloc, now consisting of Germany, Japan, Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia and Finland.
Germany was a major industrial country, and prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe she had highly developed engineering, electrical engineering, chemical, steel and other industries vital to her war economy, and considerable power resources. The subjugation of many European countries put a still greater industrial potential into the hands of the nazi rulers. In 1941 the coal and lignite output grew to 422,700,000 tons, equivalent to 257,400,000 tons of grade coal, and the aggregate output, i.e., including that of the occupied countries and the nazi satellites, was 439 million tons.
* On October 28, 1940, Italian troops invaded Greece from occupied Albania. Despite initial setbacks the Greek Army drove them out of the country.
Germany’s steel resources, too, increased considerably. In 1939 output was 22,500,000 tons. In 1941, with steel production in occupied Poland, Belgium, Northern France, Holland, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia added, the figure rose to 31,800,000 tons. When she attacked the Soviet Union, Germany had, in addition, large stocks of copper, zinc, lead, aluminium and other non‑ferrous metals.
Oil was an immensely important element of the preparations for war against the USSR. Besides her own resources, Germany had access to Rumanian, Austrian, Hungarian and Polish oil reserves. Production of synthetic fuels was stepped up. In 1941 Germany had at her disposal 8,000,000 tons of oil products. In addition, the nazis captured 8,800,000 tons of liquid fuel and lubricants in France, Belgium and Holland.
Its greatly augmented war‑economic resources enabled German industry to boost production of arms and other war equipment in 1939‑41. For example, Germany produced 10,250 aircraft in 1940 and 11,030 a year later. The output of armoured cars and light tanks rose from 800 to 2,300, and of medium tanks from 1,400 to 2,900. Manufacture of guns increased. Five thousand 75‑mm and bigger cannon were produced in 1940, and 7,000 in 1941. In those two years German industry put out 8,000 mortars and over 2,700,000 rifles and carbines. Output of submachine‑guns totalled 325,000 in 1941. Besides, Germany had a large automobile industry, ensuring the Wehrmacht with a high degree of mobility.
In the occupied European countries the Germans came into possession of the armaments and vehicles of 12 British, 22 Belgian, 18 Dutch, six Norwegian, 92 French and 30 Czechoslovak divisions, and also the stockpiles of arms that had been built up in these countries. Moreover, they had the free use of the current output of these countries’ defence industries.
Preparing for the war against the Soviet Union, the German High Command enlarged the Armed Forces. By June 1941 their strength totalled nearly 8,500,000 men.
The German High Command assigned 152 divisions (including 19 panzer and 14 motorised divisions) and two separate brigades to Operation Barbarossa. These had 3,300,000 effectives, and, in addition, there were 1,200,000 men in the Luftwaffe and 100,000 in the Navy, amounting to 77 per cent of the Wehrmacht’s total active strength. The satellite countries sent to the Eastern front 29 divisions (16 Finnish and 13 Rumanian) and 16 brigades (three Finnish, nine Rumanian and four Hungarian) totalling 900,000 officers and men. All in all, 181 divisions and 18 brigades were massed along the Soviet frontier. In the East, Germany and her satellites committed 5,500,000 effectives, of whom 4,600,000 were German troops. They had 47,260 field guns and mortars, nearly 2,800 tanks (excluding light tanks), and 4,950 aircraft.
In accordance with Operation Barbarossa, the German Command created army groups.
Army Group Norway was deployed in the Extreme North, with orders to capture Murmansk. It had six divisions, two of which were Finnish divisions. Two Finnish armies, consisting of 15 infantry divisions (of which one was German), and three brigades were poised for action in Southeast Finland. Their task was to co‑operate with Army Group North in the planned assault on Leningrad. These forces were supported by hundreds of aircraft of the 5th German Air Fleet and 500 planes of the Air Force of Finland.
Army Group North was deployed in East Prussia along a line stretching from Klaipeda to Goldap. It consisted of the 16th and 18th armies and the 4th Panzer Group (altogether 29 divisions, six of which were panzer and motorised divisions). Its mission was to crush the Soviet forces in the Baltic area and co‑operate with part of Army Group Centre in capturing Leningrad and Kronstadt. The offensive was to be supported by the 1st Air Fleet (1,070 aircraft).
The most powerful force, Army Group Centre, was massed along a line running from Goldap to Vlodava. It consisted of the 4th and 9th armies and the 2nd and 3rd Panzer groups, totalling 50 divisions (including 15 panzer and motorised divisions) and two motorised brigades. Its objective was to encircle and destroy the Red Army forces in Byelorussia and capture Polotsk, Vitebsk, Minsk, Smolensk and Gomel. This was to open the way for further operations in the direction of Moscow and help Army Groups North and South. Army Group Centre was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had 1,680 planes.
Army Group South was drawn up in the southern sector, stretching from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube. It was composed of the 6th, 17th and 11th armies and the 1st Panzer Group, the Rumanian 3rd and 4th armies and a Hungarian mobile corps (a total of 57 divisions, including nine panzer and motorised divisions, and 13 brigades). Its objective was to wipe out the Soviet forces in the Ukraine up to the Dnieper and capture crossings at and south of Kiev, setting the stage for subsequent operations eastward. Air support consisted of some 1,300 German and Rumanian aircraft.
The Army Command had a reserve of 24 divisions, including three panzer and motorised divisions.
Conditioning the nation and the army for war was part of the preparations. The powerful nazi propaganda machine worked on German minds day after day with the venom of anti‑communism, racism and chauvinism. Goebbels made every possible use of the press, radio and other media to tell Germans they were a superior race “with the Heaven‑sent mission of ruling other nations”. Nazi propaganda extolled the “successes” of the German Army in the West, and praised its “unsurpassed might” and “invincibility”.
The reign of terror against progressives continued. Hundreds of thousands of anti‑fascists were thrown into prisons and concentration camps, among them Ernst Thaelmann, leader of the Communist Party of Germany. Many Party leaders were assassinated. Part of the Communists left the country. The leadership of the Social‑Democratic Party was smashed, with many Party members imprisoned.
Chauvinist sentiment coupled with nazi brutality fettered the efforts of the anti‑fascists. The Communist Party stood staunchly at the head of the progressive forces. Working underground since 1933, it was the only political force in the country that methodically branded the aggressive policy of the German imperialists and came out in behalf of the nation’s vital interests.
But in the circumstances, the Left could not produce a broad national front or secure unity of the working class. The disruptive activities of the Right‑wing leaders of the Social‑Democratic Party constituted a grave obstacle. It had largely been due to them that the nazis came to power, and during the war they continued their old anti‑Communist line, rejecting all proposals for a united front. Their policy impaired the nation’s interest and objectively benefited the nazis.
The Communist Party of Germany called for solidarity with the peoples attacked by Hitler, for resistance to national oppression. In so doing, it acted on Karl Marx’s well‑known postulate: no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations. Leaflets described nazi crimes in occupied countries and exposed the reactionary substance of nazism, and of the war. Anti‑fascists worked perseveringly for a united front with foreign workers and war prisoners shipped into Germany.
The Communist Party warned the nation of the danger implicit in aggression against the Soviet Union. But despite the selfless anti‑fascist struggle in Germany, the nazi war against the USSR could not be averted, the split of the working‑class movement being the main reason.
***
By the summer of 1941 the war had spread to the borders of the Soviet Union. Dozens of countries were ablaze. Armies were locked in battle in Europe, Asia and Africa, with the fascist bloc attaining signal victories. Nearly all the European countries were overrun, their economic and military resources falling into the hands of the invaders. Meeting no properly organised resistance, German nazism was openly driving for world power.